Man, this is pretty cool!
http://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world...wwii-found-in-coral-sea/ar-BBJVlYA?li=BBnb7Kz
http://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world...wwii-found-in-coral-sea/ar-BBJVlYA?li=BBnb7Kz
The Lady Lex has been found in the Coral Sea
- Thread starter Displaced Bama Fan
- Start date
Just saw that, what an historical and significant find. I wonder how many USN ships from WWII still have not been found and may never be found. RIP to all the sailors who went down with her.
This becomes very intriguing to think of the desperate battles that were being fought against the full strength Japanese Navy only six months after Pearl Harbor. If the Japanese has been able to take all of New Guinea then all of Australia would be subject to Japanese attack. The allies could effectively driven out of the South Pacific. Desperate times indeed with many more trials by fire just ahead.
Not a history buff, but doesn't that seem quite far from where she should have gone down?
I don't think so. 500 miles off the east coast of Australia is pretty close to that point I would think.
I have not been able to locate a detailed map but the description of the Lexington lying 500 miles off the eastern coast of Australia appears to be generally correct.
http://www.emersonkent.com/map_archive/battle_coral_sea_midway.htm
I don't think the Japanese had enough troops to hold anything near as big a country as Australia.
Plus, I went back and counted and between CVs, CVLs and CVEs we built 121 aircraft carriers during WW II. The Japanese produced 20.
If the Japanese did not knock the US out of the war at one blow, they were going to be swamped by the enormous economic capacity of the US.
To add one additional thought, attacking the US on Sunday morning before the boobs at the Japanese foreign ministry even delivered their declaration of war meant that 99% of Americans felt they had been sucker punched. I don't believe that if the Japanese had sunk the entire Pacific fleet in Pearl Harbor that the Americans would have thrown in the towel.
A sucker punch is just dirty dadgum pool and I believe losing the entire PacFleet in December 1941 would only have meant that the Allies would have defeated Japan in 1946 instead of 1945. The way the Japanese mishandled the declaration of war made Japanese defeat inevitable.
A sucker punch is just dirty dadgum pool and I believe losing the entire PacFleet in December 1941 would only have meant that the Allies would have defeated Japan in 1946 instead of 1945. The way the Japanese mishandled the declaration of war made Japanese defeat inevitable.
The Japanese learned Sunday morning was a good day from US Navy exercises using the USS Lexington in 1932.
This American admiral planned the attack on Pearl Harbor in 1932
US Attack on Pearl Harbor
My grandfather was a Pharmacist Mate 2c then went to flight training and became a Naval Aviation Pilot. He was a pilot on the Lexington when he died in Panama in 1931.
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I don't doubt your logic as far as the economic power of the US ultimately prevailing against Japan but our priority was defeating Hitler in Europe which meant it would require time for the US to mobilize adequately to successfully prosecute a global war.
The month before the battle of The Coral Sea MacArthur had just suffered the greatest defeat in US History at Bataan against an out numbered Japanese force. Just ahead was the battle of Midway and the pitched battle for Guadalcanal with the resulting naval battles that were a fiery test for the US Navy.
I do agree with you that once Japan lost four of its carriers at Midway it could no longer conduct offensive operations but it would require nearly three years and two atomic bombs to ultimately gain surrender of the Japanese mainland.
216 crew killed.
2735 crew evacuated
FYI: the Lexington was ultimately sunk by us to prevent capture by the enemy.
2735 crew evacuated
FYI: the Lexington was ultimately sunk by us to prevent capture by the enemy.
This is where she was first hit by enemy bombs and torpedoes...
It's worth noting that the Japanese representatives at the peace conference knew about neither the declaration of war nor the attack. The communique had arrived at the Japanese embassy but hadn't been decoded and translated into English. Anyway, its wording was muddy, referring only to withdrawing from further peace negotiations and falling far short of being a declaration of war...
I would guess that the Japanese military planners were looking at the US in 1941 as an analog for Russia in 1905. "We've been here before. Punch them really hard and they will fold." The problem with the analogy was that the Russia had been at war a while by May 1905 and things elsewhere were not going well and the Baltic Fleet was Russia's last chance to turn things around. When the battle of Tsushima rendered that impossible, the Russians figured they had better sue for peace before things got worse.
The Japanese of 1941 grossly underestimated the "sucker punch" factor.
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Obviously, if they hadn't made that miscalculation, the war wouldn't have happened. Part of it was that they were drunk with power after their conquest of China. You mentioned earlier that Oz was too big for them. I'm not too sure. China was as big geographically and much larger population-wise. Oz is the most urbanized country in the world and was even back then. There's not really much in the outback to worry about. Of course, Oz was much better armed and advanced, compared to China. IDK, with hindsight, their military venture looks to have been insane...
Good points. Population of Australia in 1940 was right at 7 million.
The Japanese had conquered big hunks of Chinese territory.
The problem from the Japanese perspective is that conquering as much of China as they did bred confidence, but having conquered that Chinese territory, they then had to occupy it. Having to hold onto China and then conquer Australia would have required even more troops, further stretching Japanese resources.
Clausewitz called this effect “culmination.” As the attacker progresses, he takes casualties, he has to detach forces to occupied ground conquered. Eventually the attacker runs out of Schmitz and “culminates,” no longer has enough power over the defender to continue the advance.
I don’t know if there was enough Japanese army available in 1941 to hold onto the places they had conquered and invade and conquer Australia.
The Japanese had conquered big hunks of Chinese territory.
The problem from the Japanese perspective is that conquering as much of China as they did bred confidence, but having conquered that Chinese territory, they then had to occupy it. Having to hold onto China and then conquer Australia would have required even more troops, further stretching Japanese resources.
Clausewitz called this effect “culmination.” As the attacker progresses, he takes casualties, he has to detach forces to occupied ground conquered. Eventually the attacker runs out of Schmitz and “culminates,” no longer has enough power over the defender to continue the advance.
I don’t know if there was enough Japanese army available in 1941 to hold onto the places they had conquered and invade and conquer Australia.
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I have not researched this, but if we had lost control of Midway and Hawaii in the early stages of the war, where would we have based our Pacific operations? The Aleutian Islands? Did we have another port in the South Pacific that could replace PH? It obviously would have been a longer war without those patches of land in the middle of the ocean.
You are totally correct in your comments about the majority of the population of Australia being located in 3-4 coastal cities. As an aside, I recall that MacArthur landed on the northern coast of Australia from Corregidor and traveled by train for six days to Sydney.
After thinking of this topic from yesterday I believe the key strategic point for the Japanese would be to deny a base of operations for the Americans in the South Pacific. If they were able to deny shipping lanes to southern Australia and New Zealand then the US was effectively based all the way back to Hawaii and San Francisco which could change the nature of the war for several years.
Within a month however Midway would alter the equation permanently and set Japan on a defensive course for the remainder of the war.
We can surely say that they did not go gently into the night.
Just to take a moment to consider the basic causes of the war with Japan, which would obviously require a PhD thesis to discuss, but there are some key points:
One has to consider Japanese objectives to grow as an economic power on the Pacific rim in light of the world order at the turn of the century.
Consider the colonial and imperialistic interest of the British in Hong Kong, Australia, New Zealand and India, the British and French in IndoChina and the Americans in the Philippines, Hawaii, Wake Island and Midway. Basically the Europeans and Americans had a stranglehold on the wealth and raw materials in countries ringing Japan.
Japan had desires for a sphere of influence in the Pacific rim which would ultimately require significant diminishment of the colonial powers in the Pacific.
The inability of Japan to gain control its own destiny led to the militarist gaining power and the inevitable effort to build their economic influence through force.
If we look forward nearly a century into what many call the Asian century, we see that the Brits and French have long since departed Asia. Japan for a time grew as a mercantile power throughout Asia, Europe and the Americas until it was supplanted by China with its objective to become the hegemonic power on the global stage.
One has to consider Japanese objectives to grow as an economic power on the Pacific rim in light of the world order at the turn of the century.
Consider the colonial and imperialistic interest of the British in Hong Kong, Australia, New Zealand and India, the British and French in IndoChina and the Americans in the Philippines, Hawaii, Wake Island and Midway. Basically the Europeans and Americans had a stranglehold on the wealth and raw materials in countries ringing Japan.
Japan had desires for a sphere of influence in the Pacific rim which would ultimately require significant diminishment of the colonial powers in the Pacific.
The inability of Japan to gain control its own destiny led to the militarist gaining power and the inevitable effort to build their economic influence through force.
If we look forward nearly a century into what many call the Asian century, we see that the Brits and French have long since departed Asia. Japan for a time grew as a mercantile power throughout Asia, Europe and the Americas until it was supplanted by China with its objective to become the hegemonic power on the global stage.
Gosh, no. The U.S. would have based out of Seattle, San Fran and San Diego.
In the south Pacific, I would have guessed New Zealand or Sydney. In other words, less convenient bases, but that still would not have changed the final outcome.
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