There is a collector outside Daugavpils, Latvia who has a Sonderkraftfahrzeug in his garage. Pristine condition. He also has a T-34/85, a JS-2, an SU-100 and an SU-152, and some other vehicles. Just parked in his garage, unattended the day I visited. If you are in the neighborhood, I recommend it.Pictured: A wrecked German SdKfz. 251 halftrack vehicle in Northern France, victim of USAAF 9th Air Force fighters, July 26, 1944; July 26, 1944.
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I really do not understand the German strategy. They were piecing together a defense in Normandy and their soldiers were fighting hard, inflicting a lot of casualties, but, in the long run, what were the ends, ways and means to win, or at least extract something other than unconditional surrender? Did the Germans really think they were going to attrit the Allies into giving up? Given the calamity befalling them in the East at that same time, I do not see any strategic thought besides "Fight harder." Thank goodness Hitler was a moron, I suppose.You know, if I didn't know what was going to happen shortly, I would think that the front was essentially stalled by the Germans, that the sacrifices were just too severe to be withstood...
I do not know (I'll have to check), but I bet the USAAF flew perpendicular to the German front lines, not parallel to them, just like they did on D-Day when they missed the beach defenses and pounded the crap out of the empty Norman fields behind the German defenses. Except in this screw-up, they dropped early, and killed a bunch of American soldiers including Irvin, McNair and a bunch of guys whose names we will never know.
I think with what was happening in the east he had little choice. There was pressure across the Allied front and we were pushing more men and gear into northern France 24/7.I really do not understand the German strategy. They were piecing together a defense in Normandy and their soldiers were fighting hard, inflicting a lot of casualties, but, in the long run, what were the ends, ways and means to win, or at least extract something other than unconditional surrender? Did the Germans really think they were going to attrit the Allies into giving up? Given the calamity befalling them in the East at that same time, I do not see any strategic thought besides "Fight harder." Thank goodness Hitler was a moron, I suppose.
I think they had an inflated idea of the precision and effectiveness of their bombing, which they maintained tenaciously, despite evidence to the contrary...I do not know (I'll have to check), but I bet the USAAF flew perpendicular to the German front lines, not parallel to them, just like they did on D-Day when they missed the beach defenses and pounded the crap out of the empty Norman fields behind the German defenses. Except in this screw-up, they dropped early, and killed a bunch of American soldiers including Irvin, McNair and a bunch of guys whose names we will never know.
Flying parallel to the German defenses means slightly greater risk to the aircraft from German AAA, but makes the bombing more effective. If you drop early or late flying parallel, you may not hit this German unit but you will hit that one. Flying perpendicular to the front minimizes the threat to the aircrew, but if you drop late, you are ineffective and if you drop early, you kill friendlies on the ground.
This was a failure of leadership on the part of Ike. He should have told the air planners, "I don't really care if parallel is riskier to the aircrews. Perpendicular is riskier to the infantrymen on the ground and their lives are hard enough already."
I realize Ike had the weight of the world on his shoulder, and made a bunch of good decisions, but this one was a screw-up. A repeat screw-up of his earlier mistake on D-Day.
In the end, Hitler was not only a moron, he was a moronic corporal. I have nothing against enlisted at all. But there are good reasons not to make one your CiC. The rest of it is that Hitler had a psychological anomaly (and I won't drift off into present politics here) in that the boundaries between him and the Reich had become blurred. He and Germany were one and the same. At the end, he proclaimed that Germany had failed and didn't deserve to survive. He knew he was going to die - never would he be taken. So, the only time strategy was actually formed was the Bulge, which was always the longest shot possible. Another factor was his confidence in the German soldier and his contempt for the Allied soldiers, particularly the French contingent, admittedly small. He didn't feel the Americans and Canadians actually had a dog in the fight and would eventually fold under casualties. By this stage of the war, given the catastrophes in the east, he wasn't considering any kind of deal. It was go down anyway but go down fighting. Ike made mistakes, but the best thing which could have happened to the Allies was Hitler's micromanagement...I really do not understand the German strategy. They were piecing together a defense in Normandy and their soldiers were fighting hard, inflicting a lot of casualties, but, in the long run, what were the ends, ways and means to win, or at least extract something other than unconditional surrender? Did the Germans really think they were going to attrit the Allies into giving up? Given the calamity befalling them in the East at that same time, I do not see any strategic thought besides "Fight harder." Thank goodness Hitler was a moron, I suppose.
Found a pretty good article on the carpetbombing.I think they had an inflated idea of the precision and effectiveness of their bombing, which they maintained tenaciously, despite evidence to the contrary...
I have read that. At the end, Hitler wanted Germany punished for failing him. That was one heck of a punishment. That whole last year (May 1944-May 1945) was a massive bloodletting.In the end, Hitler was not only a moron, he was a moronic corporal. I have nothing against enlisted at all. But there are good reasons not to make one your CiC. The rest of it is that Hitler had a psychological anomaly (and I won't drift off into present politics here) in that the boundaries between him and the Reich had become blurred. He and Germany were one and the same. At the end, he proclaimed that Germany had failed and didn't deserve to survive. He knew he was going to die - never would he be taken. So, the only time strategy was actually formed was the Bulge, which was always the longest shot possible. Another factor was his confidence in the German soldier and his contempt for the Allied soldiers, particularly the French contingent, admittedly small. He didn't feel the Americans and Canadians actually had a dog in the fight and would eventually fold under casualties. By this stage of the war, given the catastrophes in the east, he wasn't considering any kind of deal. It was go down anyway but go down fighting. Ike made mistakes, but the best thing which could have happened to the Allies was Hitler's micromanagement...
True, but the ack-ack guns tended to be concentrated at the front...Found a pretty good article on the carpetbombing.
In 1944, U.S. Bombers Blasted Nazi Troops — And Accidentally Killed Scores of Americans
Lt Gen Pete Quesada (one of my heroes; I love that guy) had his 9th TAC Air Force bomb parallel. Bradley, for some reason, expected the heavies to come in parallel, and was angry when they did not.
Now, the Germans had 88mm cannons near the front. The 88 was a great anti-tank gun, but it was designed as an anti-aircraft gun, so not to be taken lightly. The 8th Air Force lost 5 (of 1,800) bombers or 0.3%. I would argue that, not only was bombing parallel more accurate and safer for the ground troops, I would say that flying perpendicular was more dangerous for the aircrews. You cannot just turn around a fleet of 1,800 aircraft on a dime, so they had to go deeper into German-control terrain, thus making them more susceptible to German AAA.
The failure to hit the large bunkers from the air, particularly at Omaha, and instead dumping the bombs behind the landing zones, for fear of hitting the landing forces, could have cost the entire invasion and did cost many lives. At Iwo Jima the Navy gave a good example of precision gunnery knocking out many of the bunkers that covered the landing beaches. The Marines also demonstrated close air support it ways that appears to me to be lacking in the ETO through to the end of the warI do not know (I'll have to check), but I bet the USAAF flew perpendicular to the German front lines, not parallel to them, just like they did on D-Day when they missed the beach defenses and pounded the crap out of the empty Norman fields behind the German defenses. Except in this screw-up, they dropped early, and killed a bunch of American soldiers including Irvin, McNair and a bunch of guys whose names we will never know.
Flying parallel to the German defenses means slightly greater risk to the aircraft from German AAA, but makes the bombing more effective. If you drop early or late flying parallel, you may not hit this German unit but you will hit that one. Flying perpendicular to the front minimizes the threat to the aircrew, but if you drop late, you are ineffective and if you drop early, you kill friendlies on the ground.
This was a failure of leadership on the part of Ike. He should have told the air planners, "I don't really care if parallel is riskier to the aircrews. Perpendicular is riskier to the infantrymen on the ground and their lives are hard enough already."
I realize Ike had the weight of the world on his shoulder, and made a bunch of good decisions, but this one was a screw-up. A repeat screw-up of his earlier mistake on D-Day.
I'm not that familiar with how the Japanese organized their beach defenses, but I have examined the Germans' Atlantic Wall. The Germans set their bunkers up to shoot obliquely along the beach, not at the beach perpendicularly. Viewed from straight out at sea, these bunkers were invisible or covered by thick concrete walls.The failure to hit the large bunkers from the air, particularly at Omaha, and instead dumping the bombs behind the landing zones, for fear of hitting the landing forces, could have cost the entire invasion and did cost many lives. At Iwo Jima the Navy gave a good example of precision gunnery knocking out many of the bunkers that covered the landing beaches.
A big part of that is having squadrons that belong to the Corps.These pilots know where their bread is buttered. Close Air Support is not a distraction from their job (which a lot of USAF fighter pilots believe it is). It is their raison d'etre.The Marines also demonstrated close air support it ways that appears to me to be lacking in the ETO through to the end of the war
I did not know that U.S. Army GIs had been issued the camouflage patter shirt/tunic. I have seen Marines in the Pacific wearing something similar, but never in soldiers in Europe.
Staged photograph, probably for Krasnaya Zvezda (Red Star, the Soviet version Stars and Stripes.) (not that the Red Army did not fire tons of mortar rounds that summer. Clearly they did.).
Add me to the puzzlement. I have never, ever seen camo in the European theater...I did not know that U.S. Army GIs had been issued the camouflage patter shirt/tunic. I have seen Marines in the Pacific wearing something similar, but never in soldiers in Europe.
Photographic evidence is so valuable.
"A picture is worth a thousand words." The dying utterance of General George Armstrong Custer.
I suspect (with no direct knowledge other than how Germans think) that German anticraft guns were layered. The greatest threat to infantry and armor on the front lines was Allied fighter-bombers. So you place anti-aircraft machine guns and smaller (20mm) caliber cannons near the front lines. Further back, where the German had more stationary potential targets (ammo dumps, fuel depots), the Germans would place larger caliber anti-aircraft artillery like the 88mm cannons (I realize there were 88s on/near the front in the anti-tank role, but we're talking AAA).True, but the ack-ack guns tended to be concentrated at the front...