GIPSA trying to pass 2010 ruling again

[bamarebel]

GIPSA Rule and Jury awards farmers of Pickett vs. Tyson/IBP $1.28 Billion

Grain inspection and stockyards administration and the USDA is attempting to change the way the big meats business.

https://www.dtnpf.com/agriculture/w...st/2016/05/26/battle-reignites-proposed-gipsa

USDA stated, “Any efforts to once again block GIPSA’s rules to ensure fair treatment of livestock and poultry growers are not acceptable to this Administration, and do not look out for the best interests of America’s farmers, ranchers and rural communities. The incessant GIPSA rider demonstrates a complete lack of concern for honest, hardworking families. Maybe some people don’t remember the hardships recently suffered by our farming families in 2008 and 2009 when producers in Arkansas, Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Tennessee and Texas lost millions of dollars and their livelihoods when just one of the major poultry businesses went under. The focus should be on how to ensure a fair marketplace and a level playing field for our farming families—nothing less. Just ask the American Farm Bureau Federation, the National Farmers Union and the National Sustainable Agriculture Coalition—groups that represent our farmers—and you’ll hear that this GIPSA rider is bad for family farmers, bad for the agriculture industry and bad for our rural communities. Everyone deserves a level playing field. Everyone deserves a fair shot.”

Scope and Unfair Practices
USDA seeks to finalize in September a proposal from June 2010 that would deal with the issues of litigation brought by poultry growers. The courts have often rules that in order for a plaintiff (a grower) to make the case that a packer imposed unfair discriminatory practices or undue preferences under Section 202 of the Packers and Stockyards Act, then the grower has to show that the packer's actions had "an adverse effect on competition." USDA is proposing to change the Packers and Stockyards Act to sway the courts into recognizing that unfair practices against an individual grower doesn't have to show harm to competition to be enforced.
http://www.reginfo.gov/…
A little more background here: The federal appeals courts have repeatedly looked at a grower's arguments in a case and concluded that the packer's treatment of the producer did not adversely affect the markets so the grower essentially has not case. Some of that was detailed in the 2010 appeals ruling, Terry v Tyson.

Tournament System in Poultry
GIPSA will propose a rule in September under Section 201 of the P&S Act addressing the tournament system in poultry payments. Companies often group growers together and then rank them on performance with those who rank higher getting more pay and those that rank lower getting more. USDA states its rule would set some requirements for companies to determine a grower's payment.
"These requirements would help to ensure fairness for poultry growers who are currently being paid according to a ranking system regardless of type and kind of poultry, age range, and target weight of birds. A live poultry dealer’s failure to comply would be deemed an unfair, unjustly discriminatory and deceptive practice according to factors outlined in the proposed rule."

Undue Preference and Advantage
This language was one of the key provisions that set off a firestorm among cattle and pork producers. It has to do with whether contracts between packers offering producers special premiums or pricing create undue pricing advantages for those producers. The rule would set criteria for USDA to decide if elements of these contracts would violate section 202 (b) of the Packers and Stockyards Act.

Not everyone likes some of the potential changes.

Leaders from the National Pork Producers Council and National Cattlemen's Beef Association argue that giving GIPSA oversight of marketing contracts would simply translate into packers further vertically integrating and owning the livestock outright. NPPC and NCBA both complained about USDA's potential rules in hearings this week.“Pork producers are very concerned about the so-called GIPSA Rule,” said NPPC past president Dr. Howard Hill before the Senate Ag Committee on Thursday. “The livestock industry will be fundamentally and negatively changed, and the increased exports and jobs created from TPP will be negated” if the rule is implemented."
Said Tracy Brunner, president of NCBA, "What we do not need is the USDA dictating how we market cattle or manage risk in the cattle industry. The industry has developed tools and alternative marketing arrangements that benefit cattle producers and consumers. We’re not asking the Senate to intervene in our contracts; we’re asking the Senate to play their role in expanding market access and ensuring we are not regulated out of business.”

http://farmfutures.com/blogs-gipsa-confusion-causing-uproar-10981

One provision included in the GIPSA rule, for example, would have required meat packers to justify and document — including with revenue and cost analyses — price differences paid for livestock, making it difficult for producers to negotiate premiums based on certain production practices or accept lower prices for livestock of lesser quality. Such a “justification” provision was considered and rejected by the Senate.

There is a little confusion in the meaning.

Barbara Patterson, government relations representative for the National Farmers Union, that this would not have required meatpackers to justify and document revenue and cost analyses or price differences but “Instead, it would have said that it would have not been permissible for packers and poultry companies to violate the Packers and Stockyards Act merely by alleging that they had legitimate ‘business justifications’ for doing so,”

An important case related to the new rule proposal is Pickett vs. Tyson/IBP.

She went on to detail this was directly related to the IBP court case where the appeals court overturned the lower court’s ruling in favor of the farmers by saying the IBP had legitimate business practices for doing so. “This amendment, that the Senate ultimately did not vote in favor of, was about that court case, not about undue preferences as suggested by the testimony.”

Excellent detail of the reason for the case and analysis of the verdict.

Pickett vs. Tyson/IBP

 

[bamarebel]

Re: GIPSA Rule and Jury awards farmers of Pickett vs. Tyson/IBP $1.28 Billion

The research paper is 29 pages and has lots of information that will never be able to post.
I think it is a very informative read and if this seems interesting you need to take the time to read it.

Plaintiff cattlemen alleged in Pickett v Tyson Fresh Meats, Inc., that Tyson/IBP used captive(contracted) supplies of slaughter cattle to manipulate the cash market, in violation of the 1921Packers & Stockyards Act (PSA). After a five week Trial in Federal Court, the Jury foundTyson/IBP guilty on all counts and assessed actual damages of $1.28 billion. The damageaward applied to a large but unspecified number of cattle, likely 10-50 million head. Punitivedamages were not allowed.Justice for Plaintiff cattlemen was short, as the Trial Judge set aside the Jury’s verdict—a rarebut not unprecedented legal action—and entered summary judgment for Tyson. The EleventhAppellate Court subsequently sided with the Trial Judge. On March 24, 2006, the United StatesSupreme Court denied without comment Plaintiff’s Petition to rehear the case, thus endinglegal activities in Pickett v Tyson and effectively killing similar legal action pending under thesame Trial Judge against two other major beef packers, Excel (Cargill) and Swift (ConAgra).This article emphasizes three significant and troubling legal and economic issues from thehistoric litigation. First, the lawsuit alleged Tyson violated the PSA, yet the Trial Judge’sinstructions to the Jury and the Jury Verdict form reflected Sherman and Clayton case lawincluding the antitrust “rule of reason (ROR).” The ROR was not included in the plainlanguage of the PSA but emerged from a 1911 Supreme Court opinion in a Sherman antitrustcase. Perhaps more importantly, the Courts incredibly narrow and extreme interpretation of theROR—not allowing a balancing of pro business benefit with harm to the market—is notconsistent with dominant legal or economic thinking.Second, the Courts endorsed Tyson’s argument that a “meeting the competition” defenseapplied, a defense that is not a part of the language of the PSA or PSA case law, but a muddledlegal and incomprehensible economic concept contained in the Robinson-Patman pricediscrimination legislation and associated case law. The Courts’ also ignored a recentDepartment of Justice (DOJ) statement that a meeting the competition defense conflicts withthe goals of the Sherman Act.Third, the Trial Judge’s post-Trial rulings and the Appellate Court’s subsequent opinion dwellat great length on their “interpretation” of the facts of the case. At issue is whether the Courtspresumptuously inserted themselves above the Jury as fact-finders in the case, contrary to the7th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution that establishes the Jury as the only fact-finder in civillitigation. 4Pickett v Tyson Fresh Meats, Inc. (abbreviated Pickett) was first filed in 1996 against IowaBeef Packers, Inc. (IBP). With litigation well underway, Tyson Fresh Meats, Inc. acquired IBPin 2001. After thrice making its way through the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals over Classcertification issues, a Class was finally certified by the presiding Senior Federal Judge onDecember 26, 2001. The Class was comprised of cattlemen who sold slaughter cattle to Tysonexclusively on the cash market.

CAPTIVE SUPPLY is cattle that are guaranteed for the week and sold on a formula that is based on the cash market and has premiums and discounts depending on the quality.

Marketing agreements with a base price tied to a cash market price distort buyer incentives.Distorted incentives are apparent to buyers, as is evident from the following statement made bya Tyson cattle buyer to Randy Stevenson11:“… an IBP cattle buyer … looked at high quality cattle we had on our showlist for sale. The market was about $66/cwt in the cash market, based on liveweight. (He) was very complimentary of our cattle’s quality. He said hishands were tied and he could not offer more for the cattle, despite their aboveaverage quality. (He) said ‘In the old days I would have been able to offer$67.50 for these cattle, but now paying more would screw up 20,000 formulacattle.’ It was completely clear to me that (the buyer) was telling me paying ahigher price for out cattle would influence prices for cattle bought on aformula contract (marketing agreement) basis, off the cash market, before thetransaction involving our cattle occurred. We lost money in this deal becauseIBP would not allow its buyer to engage in competitive bidding.”Here is the simple arithmetic of marketing agreements. Suppose that the base price for the20,00 head of formula cattle was the top-of-the-market price. Such contracts exist. Alsosuppose that another packer—maybe a very small packer--had already established the weeklytop-of-the-market price at $66.00. If the Tyson/IBP buyer pays Randy an additional $1.50/cwt($18/head) for his pen of 1,000 high quality cattle, then the “additional cost” is the extra$18,000 for Randy’s cattle, plus an extra $360,000 on the 20,000 head of formula cattle.Paying Randy an extra buck fifty on 1,000 head would have cost IBP an extra $378,000.Obviously, IBP would not bid $67.50 in a $66.00 market. Looked at another way, offering$67.50 for Randy’s pen of high quality cattle would have been the equivalent of offering$117.00/cwt in a cash market without the captive arrangement. Therefore marketingagreements distort buyer incentives.

It can make people with better cattle trade on the formula because they are unable to get the premium in the cash. Then the quality of the cash market goes down and the packer can buy those cattle a cheaper price and make the formula cheaper.

Correlation v CausationAntitrust law generally requires proof of intent to control or manipulate prices. In contrast, theP&S Act, under which Pickett v. Tyson was filed, has a lower standard in that the plainwording of the Act prohibits “any course of business … for the purpose or with the effect ofmanipulating or controlling prices16 …” Therefore intent of Tyson was not an issue in thecase. Rather, the issue was whether the business arrangements collectively referred to ascaptive supply, had the effect of lowering cash price.
Analyses of captive supply reported in the literature generally show a negative relationshipbetween cash price and captive supply (see, e.g., Ward) particularly those based on recent data.Econometric analyses presented by Plaintiffs displayed an incredibly robust negativeassociation of captive supply and cash price17. Even Tyson’s expert witnesses—one aneconometrician and the other an agricultural economist specializing in the fed cattle market--agreed under oath that there was a significant negative correlation between cash price andTyson’s captive supply. Thus an essential economic issue in Pickett v. Tyson was whether thenegative relationship was due to a causal mechanism, or simply due to correlation.
Academic debate over captive supply also focused on Causation v. Correlation. Earlyempirical studies of the captive supply issue presumed causation (see Ward for a review) until,in a USDA/GIPSA sponsored study, Schroeter and Azzam (SA) advanced a correlationhypothesis. To SA’s credit, they appropriately stated that “… we argue that the often-observednegative correlation between captive deliveries and price is not necessarily evidence of acausal linkage through which the use of captive supplies causes price to fall.” Nevertheless,some segments of the industry appeared to conveniently interpret the SA hypothesis as arefutation of causation or, worse yet, that any non-causal explanation trumped any plausiblecausal explanation.The SA correlation hypothesis was central to Tyson’s defense in Pickett19. In support ofcausation, Plaintiff’s argued several mechanisms20 of causality, including (a) market power, (b)distorted incentives due to marketing agreements having a base price tied to cash price, (c)preferential deals for selected captive feeders, and (d) use of captive supplies as a bargaininginstrument along with information asymmetry favoring the packer over the feeder.

Just Today, the

PURCHASING DIFFERENCES OF BUYING CATTLE IN THE SOUTH OR IN THE NORTH
There once was the notion that cattle owners and feeders in the north were weaker marketers of cattle. Smaller sized feedyards and less informed owners were more likely to accept the first bid or so the theory developed. For years, cattle generally sold higher on the southern plains than the northern plains. This was always puzzling in the face of the fact that northern cattle are generally better quality animals.

Today we understand more about the markets we participate in and more about the people making markets. There likely is little difference in the knowledge base of the sellers from either region or their basic psychological makeup. This leaves two primary components to explain the price variances other than quality of the animals. First in importance is the distribution of the national fed cattle available for sale when matched up with the slaughter plants. The south for years enjoyed more beef plants competing for cattle than the north. That changed with the closing of the Excel beef plant in Plainview. Second is the percent of cattle committed to beef plants which is larger in the south leaving a smaller pool of cattle to trade each week. Smaller pools mean less liquidity and more volatility both up and down. In the south, beef plant purchasing will stop before advancing the price at risk to raising the base for the committed cattle. In the north, the buyers must have the cattle for slaughter needs and pay incremental higher prices to fill their needs.

Was the case tried under PSA?

The Trial Court’s placing of a PSA case in the context of Sherman and Clayton antitrust law isat the heart of post-trial developments, and merits further consideration. As later recounted bythe Appellate Court, Pickett alleged violations of the PSA24,“Pickett and his fellow class members contend that Tyson’s marketingagreements25 violated the Packers and Stockyards Act. The relevant sectionsof the PSA make it: unlawful for any packer or swine contractor with respectto livestock, meats, meat food production, or livestock products inunmanufactured form, or for any live poultry dealer with respect to livepoultry, to: (a) Engage in or use any unfair, unjustly discriminatory, ordeceptive practice or device; or … (e) Engage in any course of business or doany act for the purpose or with the effect of manipulating or controllingprices, or of creating a monopoly in the acquisition of, buying, selling, ordealing in, any article, or of restraining commerce …”It is enlightening to contrast the plain language of the PSA, as stated above, to the Trial Court’sfinal instructions26 to the Jury,“The Packers and Stockyards Act forbids a packer from engaging in any‘unfair practice or device.’ In the context of this case, ‘unfair’ is a legal termand has a very specific meaning. The Packers and Stockyards Act is one of thenation’s antitrust laws. One purpose of these laws is to preserve our system offree and open competition.You must interpret the term ‘unfair practice or device’ using what is called a‘rule of reason.’ Under that rule, conduct constitutes an unfair practice ordevice only if it unreasonably suppresses, restrains or destroys competition.To prove that IBP (Tyson) violated the Packers and Stockyards Act, plaintiffsmust prove by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) IBP’s conduct had ananticompetitive effect on the relevant market, and (2) the conduct had nojustification or competitive benefit.”The Trial Court could have used the plain language of PSA Sections 202(a) and 202(e) in thejury instructions, but chose instead to insert its own antitrust and ROR language. JuryInstruction No. 14, quoted above, contains a bundle of statements that were objectionable toPlaintiffs. First, the Court’s exceedingly narrow but concrete definition of “unfair” isseemingly at odds with statements made by USDA/GIPSA, who is charged with enforcing thePSA. A USDA/GIPSA web site states, “Whether or not a practice is ‘unfair’ is determined on a case-by-case basis after reviewing the evidence27” yet the Court defined unfair before theJury, presumably the fact-finder in the case, had deliberated over the evidence.

 

[bamachile]

Re: GIPSA Rule and Jury awards farmers of Pickett vs. Tyson/IBP $1.28 Billion

Bamarebel, this is my first review of this issue, although I have a vague memory of some sort of discussion a few years back. Could you (or anyone, for that matter) give a brief backgrounder for ignorant people such as myself?

 

[bamarebel]

Re: GIPSA Rule and Jury awards farmers of Pickett vs. Tyson/IBP $1.28 Billion

The core of the subject starts with:
The Packers and Stockyards Act of 1921
Passage of the P&S Act in 1921 was “in response to concerns that, among other things, the marketing of livestock presented special problems that could not be adequately addressed by existing antitrust laws.”4 Parts of the act, as amended (7 U.S.C. §181 et seq.), prohibit unjustified discriminatory practices, as well as certain, specific activities that might adversely affect competition. As stated in 7 U.S.C. Section 192 of the act, it is unlawful for a packer or poultry dealer to “engage in or use any unfair, unjustly discriminatory, or deceptive practice or device; give undue/unreasonable preference/advantage to [persons or localities]”; apportion supply among packers in restraint of commerce or create a monopoly; trade in articles to manipulate or control prices, if such apportionment tends to restrain commerce or to create a monopoly; or conspire to apportion territory, or sales, or to manipulate or control prices.

Then you have the current market strategies:
Poultry farmers have a large capital investment to grow chickens for a certain processors in production contracts. They are paid by how well there chickens perform against another group of farmers. Not all the chickens are equal and if they complain there is no guarantee that they will receive another flock. Then the other companies may have not need an additional chicken house and there isn't a cash market for chickens.

The cattle market has 80% of the fed cattle sold to 4 meat packers. Then, in a given week nearly 70% of the cattle is a captive supply, guaranteed to be processed and no bid has to be made. There are economic studies that show the captive supply has a negative correlation on the cash price but no clear causation(discussed in article above).

In the Pickett vs Tyson court case, the judge overruled the jury's damages if 1.28 billion saying there wasn't enough evidence. Then the appellate court stated If a packer’s course of business promotes efficiency and aids competition in the cattle market, the challenged practice cannot, by definition, adversely affect competition.

 

[rgw]

Re: GIPSA Rule and Jury awards farmers of Pickett vs. Tyson/IBP $1.28 Billion

Our entire food system is completely screwed up. If carbon fuels don't drastically change the environment in such a way where human life is unsustainable at its current levels, I imagine that our monocultures in crops and these disgusting disease cesspools in livestock will end up being the end of us. In fact, humans are pretty resourceful as a specie and we can probably survive in a hotter on average earth but we won't be able to sustain 8bil people with monocultures induced blights and livestock waste cesspools creating superbugs.


I'm a firm believer that we should get back to a country that eats local and in-season. WWII created this desire for corporate bigness in the food industry, and we've never been able to put the genie back into the bottle since. At any rate, local food sourcing is probably a way to drive employment as everyone gets automated out of a job.

 

[bamarebel]

Re: GIPSA Rule and Jury awards farmers of Pickett vs. Tyson/IBP $1.28 Billion

Our entire food system is completely screwed up. If carbon fuels don't drastically change the environment in such a way where human life is unsustainable at its current levels, I imagine that our monocultures in crops and these disgusting disease cesspools in livestock will end up being the end of us. In fact, humans are pretty resourceful as a specie and we can probably survive in a hotter on average earth but we won't be able to sustain 8bil people with monocultures induced blights and livestock waste cesspools creating superbugs.


I'm a firm believer that we should get back to a country that eats local and in-season. WWII created this desire for corporate bigness in the food industry, and we've never been able to put the genie back into the bottle since. At any rate, local food sourcing is probably a way to drive employment as everyone gets automated out of a job.

The GIPSA rule is an attempt by our legislation to reduce some of the corporate control on today's market.
Here is someones take on the subject.

THE CURSE OF BIGNESS
The term "Big" is subjective. The application of "Big" to an entity other than your own, can mean anything or nothing. One thing everyone can agree is government is "Big". Our government and many other governments around the world are representative of the quintessential definition of bigness. Turning over decisions on how to manage our lives to the government can be disastrous and the results of those actions are repeated time after time. We have watched for 8 years as our President has tried to solve economic problems with governmental intervention and actions only to find the inevitable results fail. Whether the actions are direct punitive regulatory fines and regulations on the financial institutions or establishing a national minimum wage or forced overtime on salaried workers or the elimination of payday lenders, the results are always the same. The mortgage loans dry up or are available only at much higher interest rates or the jobs are eliminated or automated because the national minimum wage is set to high. The laws of unintended consequences are repeated over and over.

In agriculture, bigness has always been a scapegoat for things that go wrong. Suspicions about price manipulation have always been directed towards the "big" price makers whether they are the large grain companies, beef packers or simply the CME. Markets move up and down and it is always easy to find fault with those focus points for price discovery at the top whether it is the large cattle feeding firms or the video auction firm. Bigness extends also to farming when Monsanto or Deere wants to grab the farmers data and then sell those data points to advertisers or control your production methods and outlets.

The larger companies always display signs of inefficiency that many smaller operations recognize and identify. Those faults are generally overcome with efficiencies of scale and size. Spreading overhead over a larger economic base is at the heart of business efficiencies. The large companies often get sloppy and overloaded with management and find themselves vulnerable to takeover or demise. This usually occurs when smaller more efficient firms grow. This is the American way.

The food reformers hate "big". They want the world to revolve around a fictitious "family farm" where the sheep is in the meadow and the cow is in the corn. They never realize this won't feed the world. One of the ironies of the demand for more organic food, is the fact larger agribusinesses have gotten into the business of raising organic foods. The foodies hate this fact solely because they hate anyone of size and efficiency getting into this space they feel should only be reserved for the small family farmer.

In a sense, looking up or down the food chain, both "big" and "small family farm" are both relative and subject to mischaracterization. Those in the business of raising food should spend less time judging who is big or small and more time adopting change in order to produce more healthy and efficient food products that fit consumers needs. Scapegoating up or down the food chain never seems to be productive.

There was a major disease outbreak in the pork and chicken industries in 2014 when the prices of all meats rose. The Avian influenza caused massive death losses at hundreds of chicken houses and the Porcine Epidemic Diarrhea Virus caused large losses in the litter sizes. It didnt affect the quality of the meat, just the total supply. The problems continued into 2015 but by the fall the diseases went away. Meanwhile, other countries refused to purchase the meats, fearing it may spread the disease in their countries. The exports declined and the US had a larger domestic supply, forcing all prices down.

What caused these "monocultures in crops and these disgusting disease cesspools in livestock"?
The demand for cheap foods caused the feedlots and chicken houses to become more profitable than the local/family farms. The demand for cheaper foods will never change. Another problem is the rapid growth of the human population. As the population continues to grow, agriculture has to get more efficient to meet those demands.

What happened after WWII?
Everyone started to live longer, corporations became more efficient with machinery, number of people without jobs increased, and crime increased.
Before WWI, if people didnt work they wouldnt survive. A thief and murder didnt go to prison.
My point is society has changed so drastically that the problems today are the effect of some of the changes.
Politics had a major role in this changes and will require a major role to fix them.
I rather not make this about politics but nothing today can be discussed without politics.

 

[bamarebel]

Re: GIPSA Rule and Jury awards farmers of Pickett vs. Tyson/IBP $1.28 Billion

The claimed economic impact of the GIPSA Rule.

"American Meat Institute
The first impact analysis of the proposed rule that the meat industry released on October 21, 2010, was the Economic Impact of Grain Inspection, Packers and Stockyards Administration Proposed Rule,43 prepared for the American Meat Institute (AMI). The analysis concluded that the proposed rule would result in increased litigation that would cause meat producers to move away from the use of marketing agreements and return to cash or spot market purchasing. The study contended that this would increase inefficiencies and raise retail meat prices and reduce meat demand. It projected that this would result in a $14 billion decline in U.S. gross domestic product (GDP) and a loss of more than 104,000 jobs.
National Meat Association
On November 8, 2010, Informa Economics, Inc. released An Estimate of the Economic Impact of GIPSA’s Proposed Rules.44 The study was prepared for the National Meat Association (NMA) in cooperation with the National Cattlemen’s Beef Association (NCBA), the National Pork Producers Council (NPPC), and the National Turkey Federation (NTF). The study’s researchers interviewed beef, pork, and poultry industry participants to determine expected responses to the proposed rule and expected costs and then used the information to determine impacts on the industries and the U.S. economy.
The Informa study made one-time estimates of the direct costs to the industries—costs associated with compliance to the proposed rule—at $136 million ($39 million for beef, $69 million for pork, and $28 million for poultry). Ongoing direct annual costs were projected at $169 million ($62 million for beef, $74 million for pork, and $33 million for poultry). The estimated indirect costs—losses due to reductions in product quality and/or efficiencies—were substantially higher. The annual losses were estimated at more than $1.3 billion ($780 million for beef, $259 million for pork, and $302 million for poultry). The Informa study estimated the economy-wide impact to be a reduction of $1.56 billion in GDP and nearly 23,000 lost jobs. The Informa study noted that it would take two to three years for the decline in efficiency to result in the losses, and that the costs would lessen over the long term as the industries adjusted.
National Chicken Council
The National Chicken Council released Proposed GIPSA Rules Relating to the Chicken Industry: Economic Impact on November 11, 2010.45 The report was prepared by FarmEcon LLC and focused only on the chicken industry. The study estimated that the proposed rule would cost the chicken industry more than $1 billion over five years, with costs increasing each year. Over the fiver-year period of 2011 to 2015, feed and housing costs would increase $794 million; costs associated with bird death loss from less efficient management and increased feed sampling and analysis costs would increase $225 million. In addition, the study projected a one-time administrative cost of $6 million for the industry during the first year. Furthermore, the FarmEcon study found that the proposed rule would lead to higher costs associated with increased litigation, which it said would cause the U.S. chicken industry to be less innovative."

http://nationalaglawcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/assets/crs/R41673.pdf