In the end, the software did its job entirely too well. The problem was with the sensors, which kept telling the software that the airframe was nose-up. I suppose you can argue that after the second porpoise maneuver, the software should have said "wait a minute." Anyway, the airlines which decided to cheap out and not add the second sensor (which should never have been charged for, anyway), doomed their passengers, given the software. That didn't just cut their safety margin by a mere 50%. There is no way to estimate by what factor they increased risk. Suffice it to say that, if they had known the problems with the entire system, they would never have cut that second sensor. The 737 Max may never make the air again and that's a shame for Boeing and for the country. There are people who will never board one again - no matter what. I'm not even sure that I could. If the entire affair had been conducted correctly to begin with, the present situation wouldn't have happened. The CEO properly should have fallen on his sword...It seems the design of the MAX should have warranted a more rigorous (or full) certification. Relocating the engines doesn't seem like a minor tweak. At least part of the reason for the software was to make plane pass a stall design criteria - keeping it from nosing up.